PROGRESS OF'THE LAW.
As MARKED. BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADMIRALTY.

It is well known that extraordinary services on the part of
a tug are necessary to bring its work under the head of salvage,
and the case of The Sir RobertFernie,96 Fed. 348,
is interesting as furnishing a set of facts which were
Wht
services by a held to constitute a salvage service. In that case
Tugwill
a steel bark, with a valuable cargo, was moored to
a buoy in Tacoma Harbor when, on a stormy
night,

the buoy's anchor chain parted and the vessel drifted broadside
towards the shore. A tug, though shorthanded, came to her
rescue and succeeded in saving her after five hours of incessant
labor and peril. The tug and her crew were exposed to
danger, and the tug's boiler and engines were considerably
strained by her efforts.
An interesting opinion discussing the liability of ship owners
for injuries to seamen caused by the negligence of the master
is to be found in the case of Olson v. Oregota Coal
Seamen,
Liabilityof and Nazigation Company, 96 Fed. io9 (D. C.,
Owner for N. D. Cal.). In this case a seaman was injured
by falling through a hatchway negligently left
Injuris
open by the master. The hatchway in itself was a proper
one and no claim of negligence in the selection of the officers
of the ship was mAde. It was held that the seaman and the
master of the ship are fellow servants in all matters pertaining
to the navigation of the ship, and a recovery was denied. The
question is not free from doubt, but the authorities are carefully
reviewed in the opinion and the better view seems to have been
expressed.
In the case of Tue Ethelred, 96 Fed. 446 (P. C., E. D. Pa.),
a libel in rem was filed for injuries sustained by a seaman who
Seamen, had been directed by the officer in charge to make
Liaiblty of use of a certain rope for his support while washing
Vessel for down the mast. The rope proved weak and broke
I-jur to
under the libellant's weight, letting him fall to the
deck.

McPherson, J., sustained the libel, holding that there
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ADMIRALTY (Continued).

had been negligence in failing to examine the rope which,
being just aft of the funnel, was exposed to smoke and heat,
and occasionally to sparks or flames.
The court evidently regarded this failure of the officers to
inspect, .and the consequent providing for the seaman of unsafe
appliances, as the act or the owner of the vessel. How does
this case square with the general rule laid down in 0son v.
Na gation Co., supira? Is the rule which is to be extracted
from these cases, as follows: When the master and the seamen
are working together in the ordinary navigation of the ship,
they are fellow servants ; but when the master orders a seaman
to perform a distinct duty, he is to be regarded as a viceprincipal?
The power of a captain of a ship has always been of necessity quite arbitrary, and it is held in a recent case that where
Se me, there is no proof of malice or excessive punishGOledese
ment he will not be held liable for assault and
battery when he uses physical force to compel prompt obedience to his orders: Stout v. Weedin, 95 Fed. iooi (D. C.,
Wash.).
In The Escanaba, 96 Fed. 252 (D. C., N. D. ILL.), Judge
Kohlsaat has applied the rule giving priority to the lien which
is later in time, to a case where the conflict was
Liens,
priority
between the claims of shippers for goods lost by
'the tort of the master and liens for supplies furnished prior to
the tort.

BANKRUPTCY.

The application of the bankrupt in question for his discharge
was opposed on the ground that he had made a false oath in
swearing that he had no assets, when in fact he
Discharge,
False Oath, had, four months previous to the commencement
Concealment of the proceedings, transferred a large stock of
of Assets
goods to his wife. Toulmin, Dist. Judge, held
that while the transfer was void as to creditors and might be
set aside by the trustee in bankruptcy, yet it was valid in regard to the bankrupt himself and did not amount to such an
intentional fraud as would deprive the bankrupt of his discharge.
The same was held of an omission, probably through oversight, of a certain debt in the bankrupt's schedule of liabilities:
In re Crenshaw, 95 Fed. 632.
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What is the status of a debt which the bankrupt includes
in his schedule, but which has been barred by the statute of
Debt Barred limitations ? Such *as the question certified to
by Statute of the District Court (D. Minn.) by the referee in
Limitations bankruptcy in In Re Resler, 95 Fed. 804. Counsel for the proving creditor strongly urged that even if the
barred debt was not provable,-on which point the authorities
cited seemed to be in great conflict,-yet the inclusion of the
debt in the bankrupt's schedule was a clear waiver of the objection that the statute had run, and from such waiver and the
written acknowledgment a promise was implied to pay the
creditor. However, Judge Lochren disallowed the claim, but
some expressions in his short opinion seem rather to confine
its effect to cases arising in Minnesota.
It would seem unnecessary to decide that a person's oath
before a referee in bankruptcy will not have the effect of depriving him of a right guaranteed him by the
Refusalto
Take Oath, constitution.
Yet in In Re Scott, 95 Fed. .815,
Self.
the bankrupt possessed such a tender conscience
Incrimination that he refused to take the oath required by § 7
before the referee, unless there was added theproviso, "Reserving, however, the right to claim any lawful privilege as
against or in relation to any question upon any examination."
It seemed that the bankrupt was afraid that he would bind
himself to give an answer to a question liable to incriminate
himself, contrary to the fifth amendment. Judge Buffington
properly decided that the bankrupt should have taken the
oath in the original form; that the constitution of the United
States was sufficiently strong to make implied exceptions of
matters which it prohibited; and it would be time enough
for the bankrupt to raise the objection when he was asked a
question infringing upon his constitutional privilege.
The District Court (N. D. Mass.) has decided that where a
husband, who is entitled to curtesy in the land of his wife,
is placed in bankruptcy during the life of his wife,
Assets,
Curtesy in his curtesy does not pass to the trustee, since it is
Land
not property which he can convey or assign.

Nor is it a "power" within § 70 (3) of the act which provides
for the vesting in the trustee of all "powers" which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own benefit: Hesseltine v.
Pilce, 95 Fed. 8o2.
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BANKS AND BANKING.

Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728, one of the many cases growing
out of the failure of the Chestnut Street National Bank of
Philadelphia, will be of interest to the many deinslvet
positors in that institution. A bill was filed against
the receiver of the bank, averring that the bank
closed its doors at 3 P. M. on December 22, 1897,
of ofcers that within an hour prior to that time the com-

Bank,
rnow--d

plainant had made a deposit, and that, when the deposit was
received, the bank's officers knew that it was hopelessly insolvent. The complainant, therefore, prayed to have his
deposit declared a trust fund. The Circuit Court (E. D.
Penna.), in an opinion by Judge Gray, while admitting that
the above result would follow if complainant's premises were
correct, yet, after a thorough examination of the evidence,
decided that even up to 1o P. M. on December 22, 1897,
there was no proof that the bank's officers considered it hopelessly insolvent, since they .had hopes that it would receive
outside assistance on December 23d, and the mere fact that
the bank was in embarrassed circumstances at the time of the
deposit was insufficient to warrant the creation of a trust.
This decision, unless it is reversed, will probably block off a
number of suits by depositors of December 22, 1897, who
hope in this way to gain an advantage over their fellowsufferers.
The president of the defendant bank had disappeared with
funds of the bank, supposedly, in his possession. The cashier
Promise by. of the bank promised the plaintiff that if the latter
Cashier to would find the president, the bank would honor
In an
Honor Check plaintiff's check for a certain amount.
action against the bank for failure to honor the check, it was
held, that under the circumstances the cashier had sufficient
authority to-bind the bank in this matter, and that there was
a consideration for the check in the advantage which the bank
would gain by the discovery of its president: Valdetero v.
Citizens' Bank, 26 So. (La.) 425.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Encouraged, perhaps, by the frequency with which federal
courts grant injunctions, the complainant in Kiernan v. MuttDue Process nomah County, 95 Fed. 849, actually went into
the federal court to obtain an injunction against
of Law.
illegal Levy

of Property

the sheriff of his own county, on the ground that

the sheriff had levied upon his property under
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unauthorized proceedings, and that; therefore, the act of the
sheriff was a deprivation of complainant's property without
due process of law, contrary to the fourteenth amendmenf!
Judge Bellinger, of the Circuit Court (N. D. Oregon), disappointed the complainant, by informing him, in a short opinion,
that the fourteenth amendment was levelled at the states and
not at individuals, "otherwise every invasion of the rights of
one -person by another would be cognizable in the federal
courts under this amendment."

CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of the United States has given another
instance of the extreme rigor with which it applies the docUltra Vires, trine of ultra tires in corporation cases without
Power of regard to the equities of each particular case. In
ak Nat: Bank v. Hawkins, 19 Sup. Ct. 739, it apNationHl
to Hold Stock

peared that the A. national bank held stock of the
B. national bank and collected the dividends
regularly, as the registered owner. On the failure of the B.
bank, its receiver brought an action against the A. bank to
recover the statutory assessment on the stock. He obtained
a judgment in the Circuit Court, which was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals (33 U. S. App. 747, 24 C. C. A.
444), from which a writ of error was taken to the Supreme
Court.
The opinion, by Justice Shims, consistently follows the
extreme view which the Supreme Court has always taken on
the subject of corporate power, or rather, lack of corporate
power. After citing Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S . 362, to
show that a national bank does not possess the power to hold
stock of another national bank, he explains that the Circuit
Court of Appeals was in error by reasori of its failure to
observe the distinction between the power of a national bank
to purchase stock for an investment and its power to hold it
merely as collateral security; the power exists in the latter
instance, but is absent in the former. A determined effort
was made by counsel to persuade the court that the A. bank,
by receiving the dividends and partaking of the advantages
of the transaction, was estopped from setting up its own lack
of power when a legitimate burden was abo.t to be cast upon
it. But the court said that it had never recognized any such
doctrine in regard to cases involving corporate power, quoting
of Another
Bank
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the decisive words of Justice Gray on this subject in Cent.

Trans. Co. v. Pull.Pal. Car Co., 139 U. S. .24.
The doctrine of immunity from estoppel, just mentioned, is
applied by the Supreme Court of the United States only to
kT~UI*IACtS acts ultra vires of the corporation itself and not
of Officers of to acts of officers of the corporation which are
CorPoatlon,
Hsto~i

irregular in that they have not received the actual
consent of the corporation. Thus in Louirwlle,

etc., Rwy. Co. v. Louisidlle Trust Co., io Sup. Ct 817, a corporation had guaranteed certain negotiable bonds of another
corporation. In a suit on the guarantee by a bonafde holder
of the bonds, the defence set up was that the guarantee was
void for want of the assent of a majority of the defendant's
stockholders. In holding that defendant was estopped from
setting up the defence, Justice Gray clearly marks the distinction between irregular acts wholly within the corporate power
and acts ultra ires, relying principally on Zabriskie v. R. P.
Co., 23 How. 381, and St. Louis, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Terre
Haute, etc., Rwy. Co., 145 U. S. 393.
DAMAGUS.

The Supreme Court of Alabama, following Ginna v R. R.,
8 Hun, 494, has decided that where a person receives an
D.thf,o,
Blood
Poisoning

injury to his hand through the negligence of
another, by reason of which blood poisoning sets
in, resulting in death, the death may be consid-

ered the proximate result of the injury, even though the
blood poisoning has not made its appearance until some time
after the injury. It is not of importance that such a result
does not generally follow wounds of this character, nor is it
incumbent upon the person injured to show that he received
the germs of the blood poison in the accident: Armstrong v.
Montgomery St. Rwy. Co., 26 So. 349.
BVIDENCE.

A., who was indicted for adultery committed with B., failed
to call B. as a witness at the trial. In his closing argument,
Failure to
Produce

the prosecuting attorney commented on this fact,
relying upon the rule that if a party has a witness

possessing peculiar knowledge of the transaction
and supposed to be favorable to him, and he fails
to oroduce such witness when he has the means of doing so,
Witness ,

Presmptlo
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this, in the absence of all explanation, is ground for suspicion
against the defendant that such better informed testimony
would make against him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Alabama (Tyson, J., dissenting), held that the above rule did
not apply to this case, since, even if B. had been called, he
could not have been forced to divulge facts tending to incriminate himself. The action of the district attorney.was therefore held error: State v. Brock, 26 So. 329.
In an indictment for rape, in order to prove that the prosecutrix was under the age of sixteen, the prosecution offered,
•Hnonesty," and the court admitted in evidence, a written cercertificate tificate of baptism in which the cldrgyman had
given the date of the prosecutrix. This was held;
of Birth
error, by the Supreme Court of New Jersey: State v. Snover,
43 Atl. 1059.
The defendant's counsel offered to ask a witness, "Do you
know what is his [defendant's] reputation for morality, virtue
and honesty in living?" The prosecution objected on the
ground that, while evidence of defendant's general character
was relevant, yet no evidence of defendant's specific character
on any subject was admissible except upon the subject referred
to in the indictment; that evidence of defendant's I"honesty"
could refer only to his financial probity and was therefore
irrelevant, for the only subject upon which specific evidence
of character could be given was that of defendant's sexual
laxity. The court held that the question should have permitted, since, under the circumstances, the word, "honesty,"
imported chastity and was equivalent to "sexual morality;"
citing authorities including Chaucer and Shakespeare.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Brown's Appeal, 44 Atl. 22, presented a remarkable state
of facts. The -husband, A., was divorced.from his wife, B.,
the latter being the innocent party. A. subseDivorce,
quently married C.," from whom he was also
Effect on
Dower Right,

Remarriage

divorced, C. being the innocent party.

A. then

married D., who survived him as his lawful wife.

Both B. and C. had remarried after their divorces from A.
On A.'s death, B. and C. claimed dower in his land under
Conn. Gen. St. (1877), § 618, which provide that a divorced
wife, who is the innocent party and shall survive her husband,
shall have one-third of his real estate for life.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).
The Supreme Court of Connecticut,'in a rambling opinion,
decided that, under the circumstances, the true intent of the
stattite did not give B. and C. rights of dower, since A. had
left a lawful wife surviving him. In reaching this conclusion
the court relied largely on the Act of 1849 (p. 274), which
allowed a divorced person to marry again. The argument of
the court seems to be that since, under the Act of 1849, a
man may leave a lawful wife surviving him, as he did in this
case, the Act of 1877 could not have been intended to apply
here, since, if B. and C. could have claimed dower, they could
not have interfered with D.'s undoubted right of dower, and
the result would be that three persons would be allowed
dower on the ground that each was A.'s wife at the time of
his death. Moreover, the court construes the Act of 1877 as
admitting a woman to dower "only because she represents,
and no other is, the wife living with her husband, or separate
Of course, with D. surviving, neither B.
through his fault."
nor C. could be said to be in such a position.
The question naturally asserts itself: Was it the fact of A.'s
remarriage that cut off B. and C., or was it the fact that D.
survived A.? In other words, if D. had died before A., would
B.'s and C.'s rights have been any different? The court refuses to commit itself on this point, but would seem not indisposed to lay down the rule that the mere fact of remarriage
after divorce is of itself sufficient to oust the divorcee's rights :
"If, upon marriage after divorce, the link between the wife and
her divorced husband which supports her claim to dower is
finally severed, no troublesome questions will arise, no matter
how many times a man is divorced; otherwise such questions
as have been discussed in this case may arise whenever a man
dies, leaving more than one divorced widow and no genuine
widow. . . . But they [these questions] are not likely to
become practical. Such a case as this has never been presented to this court, and it is to be hoped that it may never
arise again."
INSURANCE.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has decided that an
insurance company waived its rights to demand proofs of loss,
Waver of according to the policy, under the following cirProofs of Lo- cumstances: After the fire plaintiff notified the
general agent of the company, who said that D., an adjuster,
would attend to the matter. D., having been sent from the
office of the company, viewed the premises with the plaintiff
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and suggested that the amount of the loss should be determined by one F. The latter, a few days afterwards, handed
his figures to D., but nothing more was done by any of the
parties. The court, in holding that the above facts constituted
a waiver of the proofs of loss, mentioned Everet v. Ins. Co.,
142 Pa. 332, as a case contra to the above decision. It would
not seem that Everett v. Ins. Co. decided anything different,
for in that case the decision was expressly based upon the
fact that, as Justice Mitchell said in his opinion, no evidence
of authority appeared whereby the adjusters could waive any
provisions in the policy, while in the case at bar the court
said that the fact that D. was sent by the company itself in
reply to a letter to the general office was sufficient evidence of
his authority to act on behalf of the company: -WNolly v.
Western Assurance Co., 54 N. E. 548.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

The Vermont statute on the subject of justices of the peace
(V. S. § io4o) provides that the justices shall have-jurisdicdemand
Jurisdiction, tion "where the debt or other matter in
does not exceed $200." An action was brought
Amount of
claim,
Judgment

before a justice on a judgment of $249.I5, .on

which a certain amount had been collected, so

that the balance remaining due was $145.52. It was urged
on behalf of the defendant that the test of the jurisdiction was
the amount of the judgment, but the Supreme Court of Vermont properly held that the amount really involved was
$145.52, and allowed jurisdiction: Page v. Warner, 44 Atl. 67.
NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has lately had occasion to
apply and extend the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3,
H. L. 330. In the case before it, Bradford
Glycerine Co. v, St. Mary's Mfg. CO., 54 N. E.
Storing
528, the facts showed that the defendant was the
Land,
Proof of
owner of a magazine and contents,? containing
Negligence
about fifty quarts of nitroglycerine, situgted about
a mile from plaintiff's property and separated from it by the
lands of several persons. While one of the defendant's servants was placing some nitroglycerine in the magazine it
exploded with great force, causing vibrations in the atmosphere sufficient in power and violence to sh~atter the glass
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windows of plaintiff's buildings. Plaintiff was unable to show
that the defendant's servant was in any way negligent in
handling the nitroglyceriie, but he claimed the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In support of his contention, plaintiff cited the cases of
Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 638, and Hay v. Cohoes Co.,
2 N. Y. 159, which illustrate the well-recognized doctrine
that, where one, in blasting rocks on his own land, casts fragments on the land of another, causing injury, it is no defense
to show that ordinary care has been taken in the working of
the blast. Counsel for defendant contended that these cases
were not in point, since in the one case the damage was
caused by fragments of rock being hurled upon or against
the property injured, while in the other case nothing was
thrown upon the property, but the injury occurred through
the medium of the atmosphere-something that was not to be
naturally expected. However, the court very sensibly decided that the manner of the injury was immaterial to fix the
liability, which latter was established in respect to plaintiff's
property by the mere fact of the explosion.
It was then strongly contended on behalf of the defendant
that, since no presumption of negligence arises from the mere
fact that a steam boiler explodes, to the injury of an adjoining
property--see Marshallv. Wel,ood, 38 N. J. L. 339; Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476-there was no reason for applying
the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands to the case of carefully'stored nitroglycerine. The court said that th: reason for
making the distinction was that steam engines and boilers are,
at the present day, in so common use and attended with so
little danger to the neighboring properties that they cannot be
said to constitute nuisances per se. Not so, however, with a
magazine of nitroglycerine. The existence of a manufacturing
plant is often attended with the rise in value of neighboring
properties, while the presence of nitroglycerine can have no>
other than a disastrous effect with such values. The one is
an ordinary, the other is an extraordinary, use. of property.
Finally, the court disposes of the argument that the liability
for the explosion was confined to the adjacent properties by
stating that the rule of Fletcher v. Rylands includes all injuries
"within the lines of the danger," and the lines of the danger
in this case were fixed only by the limits of the atmospheric
vibrations' ability to injury property. The opinion in this case,
by Bradbury, C. J., well repays a reading, since the question,
now a comparatively new one, will probably arise often in the
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future, and the law on the subject is collated in a remarkably
able manner. Shauck, J., dissented, but delivered no opinion.
.eARTNERSHIP.

It is provided by the Special Partnership Act of Michigan
(How. Ann. Stat. § 2348) that, at the time of the formation of
Contribution the special partnership, one or more of.the general
of Money" partners shall file an affidavit stating that the
by Special special partner has paid in his requisite amount
Partor. "in money or other property at cash value." In
Check
Chick v. Robinson, 95 Fed. 619, a creditor of the
partnership attempted to hold the special partner to the liability
of a general partner on the ground that the contiibution of the
special partner had been made, not in money, but by a check,
which check, however, had been honored on presentation.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the" Sixth Circuit, while
admitting that many courts hold a special partner to the very
strictest compliance with the words of the statute in order to
shield him from general liability-see Haggerty v. Foster, 103
Mass. 17-nevertheless held that a check, filed in good faith,
and which has been subsequently honored, comes within the
intendment of the above section. "Doubtless the weight of
authority in the construction of limited partnership statutes is
to the contrary; but, as already said, the trend of modem
cases is towards a more liberal and sensible view of such
statutory requirements. Their purpose is to secure the actual
payment of the money into the capital of the firm, and, failing
that, to hold the partner to a general liability. It seems to us
that our construction of the statute secures this end, and it
does not entrap the honest and unwary into unexpected liabilities by enforcing a stricter rule as to what are cash payments
than obtains in the commercial community." Per Taft, J.
SALES.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has enforced strictly
the rule of law which requires a.sale of personal property to be
Change of accompanied by an open and notorious change of
Possession, possession, in order to be effective against the
Notice to creditors of the vendor.
Thus, in Janelli v.
Creditors Denoncour, 44 Atl. 62, which was an action
against a sheriff for levying on a kiln of bricks as the property of B., which A., the plaintiff, claimed to have been
previously sold to him by B., it appeared that A. had recorded
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the bill of sale in the office of the towri clerk on the day of
the sale; that B.'s wife had given A. permission to allow the
bricks to remain in B.'s yard; and that A. had sent his servant at night to cover the bricks with a cloth. None of these
facts were held to afford A. any claim against the creditor of
B. making the levy, since (I) the recording of the bill of sale,
not being required by law, was no notice to creditors, (2) the
permission given by B.'s wife was of no avail, since B.'s wife
did not own the yard, and (3) the covering of the bricks by
A.'s servant at night was not an open and visible assertion ot
property in them by A.
STATUTES.

The Bankruptcy Act of July I, 1898 (30 Stat. 544), provides that "this act shall go into full force and effect upon its
Tiameatwhich passage, . . . and no petition for involuntary
statutes go" bankruptcy shall be filed within four months of
Into EiI-t the passage thereof." In Carriage Co. v. Stengel,
95 Fed. 641, where a petition for involuntary bankruptcy had
been filed November I. 1898, the court was asked to take
judicial notice of the exact hour and minute on July I, 1898,
when the act went into effect. This the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to do, Judge Taft saying
that they would follow the ordinary presumption that a statute
takes effect from the first minute of the day on which it is
passed; that a court should abandon the presumption and
receive evidence of the exact time at which a statute is passed
only when the application of the presumption would impart a
harsh and retroactive effect to the statute. The proceedings
before the court were therefore upheld.

SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.

The exact nature of a widow's right of action for the death
of her husband, caused by negligence, has been the subject of
Action by
Widow for
Death of
Husband,

Act of usband as Bar

much discussion.

It seems that in the state of

Washington a carrier may lawfully contract for
freedom from liability for negligence resulting in

injury to a person carried on a free pass. In
Adams v. Northern Pac. Rwy. CO., 95 Fed. 939,

the question was whether or not such a contract barred the
right of the widow of the person carried, given under a statute
based on Lord Campbell's Act. Following the rule adopted
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by the Supreme Court of the United States and many jurisdictions, the Circuit Court (E. D. Wash.) held .that the right
of the widow was entirely separate from the right which the
husband might have, and therefore his contract with the railroad did not constitute a bar to his action. The contrary
view has been adopted in Pennsylvania.
WILLS.
In Alabama there is the usual statute providing that every
devise of land shall be construed as a devise in fee, unless a
intention to contrary intention appears. In Johnson v. Land
Create Fee
Co., 26 So. 36o, the devise was '"to A. for life,
Simple Estate

and after her death to her children.

Should she;

however, die without children, I give at her death to B." It
was urged that B. was to take only upon the event of surviving A., but the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that
there was not sufficient evidence to take it without the statute,
and that the devise should be read to B. and his heirs.
The testator in this will left his son, J., "one dollar, and no
more." There was no residuary clause in the will, and the
Referenc to testator left a piece of land undisposed of by the
Property not will.

In an action to determine whether or not

J. should have a share in the undevised land, it
was argued that the evident intention of the testator was that
J. should have nothing more than his dollar from the whole
Devised

estate, and so the intention probably was, but the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire restricted the effect of the words,
"and no more," to the property left by the will, and allowed
J. to share in the undevised land: Wells v. Anderson, 44
Atl. 103.

